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     We  compare  alternative  optimal  public  debt  adjustment  strategies  in  a 
New Keynesian economy. We find that the unconditionally optimal policy is 
consistent with a gradual adjustment in public debt towards its mean value at 
a speed determined by the rate of time preference of agents. To a second-order 
approximation  in  a  stochastic  setting,  debt  follows  a  unit  root  process  with  a 
negative  drift  under  the  'timeless-perspective'  approach  but  converges  to  an 
unconditional  mean  different  from  the  non-stochastic  steady  state  in  the 
unconditionally optimal economy. Overall, increases in public  debt are shown 
to be optimally reduced by half only after approximately two decades at best. 
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Maintaining ￿scal solvency requires matching outstanding government liabilities
by a discounted stream of future budget surpluses. When in￿ ation or lump sum
taxes cannot be used as a costless means to deal with inherited debt or to restore
solvency following shocks, appropriate use of public debt facilitates smoothing of
distortions over time. If governments borrowed excessively in the past or borrow
at present to partially absorb the consequences of shocks, the question arises: How
to deal with the higher stock of public debt?
In pursuit of new answers to this question, we introduce the concept of
unconditional optimality in the sense of Damjanovic et al. (2008) to ￿scal policy in
an otherwise standard New Keynesian economy. The policy we examine is also the
optimal continuation policy proposed by Jensen and McCallum (2010), which is
the best policy on average for all possible initial conditions in a dynamic economy.
We ￿nd that the speed of debt reduction consistent with the unconditionally
optimal policy is determined by the rate of time preference of agents.
The prevailing wisdom is that it is optimal to allow permanent increases in
debt and taxes following structural shocks under nominal rigidity.1 This result
has been derived in ￿rst-order-accurate models, in which welfare is de￿ned over
a conditional welfare measure that discounts future welfare losses, whilst taking
into account the impact of current policy decisions on past expectation formation.2
The optimality of this strategy rests on a version of the tax smoothing argument
according to which it is best to keep debt and taxes permanently higher to avoid
a more abrupt short-term reaction in taxes and hence prices. One implication of
this policy is that any inherited level of liabilities should be validated by the policy
1See Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2006) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004a).
2We do not consider discretionary policies in this paper given that they are clearly inferior
in terms of welfare to policies that take into account the impact of current decisions on the past
under standard conditions.
2maker. With an unconditional objective, the strategy under which taxes are kept
permanently higher cannot be optimal. Intuitively, long-term outcomes implicitly
receive a higher weight, given that the policy maker e⁄ectively maximizes an
undiscounted sequence of period utility functions, which would make the strategy
of permanently higher level of taxes that would have to accompany a permanently
higher level of debt very costly. Instead, we observe a gradual reduction in public
debt to its steady state value. This is a shared feature with the optimal policy
under discretion, as is the related fact that the unconditionally optimal policy
involves less inertia in the conduct of policy relative to optimal policies consistent
with a unit root for debt and taxes.3
We also examine second-order-accurate optimal strategies. Adam (2010) has
argued that in such a case, higher debt generates larger risks to the budget and
the distortive tax rate, which in turn renders a gradual reduction in debt optimal.
We show that in a stochastic economy, public debt follows a unit root process
with a drift under the second-order-accurate timelessly optimal strategy. The
corresponding unconditionally optimal result for public debt involves convergence
to an unconditional mean di⁄erent from the non-stochastic steady state. In our
analysis, these results are mainly driven by the impact of uncertainty in the
economy on (the utility value of ) the ￿rms￿marginal revenue. Expected marginal
revenues are a key factor in the ￿rms￿price-setting decision, and hence their
responsiveness to uncertainty in the economy is an important second-order e⁄ect
that has to be considered in an environment in which stabilization of (relative)
prices is a primary concern. When marginal revenue is convex in uncertainty, as
is the case in the unconditionally optimal economy, optimal in￿ ation stabilization
requires a small reduction in the mean level of output relative to the steady state.
3Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) provide a detailed analysis of optimal ￿scal policy under
discretion in a New Keynesian framework.
3The economy thus moves into a territory where marginal revenue is less responsive
to uncertainty about government spending. The ￿scal policy that implements this
then involves on average higher taxes relative to the steady state, which ￿nance
on average higher debt in the economy. By contrast, marginal revenue responds
to increases in uncertainty at a falling rate under timeless perspective, and the
converse of this argument holds. However, we argue that the adjustment in second-
order-accurate stochastic settings and the underlying intuition might be model-
and shock-dependent.
We also show that the time-series properties of public debt from the ￿rst-order-
accurate analysis are restored if second-order-accurate economies are treated as
deterministic.
Overall, when a gradual debt reduction is an element of an optimal debt
adjustment strategy, the prescribed rate of reduction is very slow. At best, the
rate of reduction should be in line with the rate of time preference of agents,
implying a half life for the deviations from mean of public debt and also the debt-
to-GDP ratio of 69 quarters under a standard parameterization. In terms of the
speed of adjustment, our results echo the ￿ndings of Siu (2004) and Kirsanova and
Wren-Lewis (2006). Such a slow adjustment rate is also not at odds with some
of the empirical evidence. Friedman (2005), for example, ￿nds a half life of 85
quarters for the response of the debt-to-GDP ratio to a shock to itself on postwar
US data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
microfoundations of a standard New Keynesian economy with endogenous ￿scal
dynamics. In section 3, we introduce and de￿ne the concept of unconditional
optimality in general terms. In section 4, we summarize the key results from
our numerical exercise, and put them into a broader context. Finally, section 5
concludes.
42. The model
In this section, we brie￿ y set out the microeconomic foundations of our economy.
The model is a standard New Keynesian economy with endogenous ￿scal
dynamics. We present the key relationships in their non-linear form.
2.1. Consumers
Our model economy is inhabited by an in￿nite number of identical households
of measure one. The representative household derives positive utility from total
consumption C of di⁄erentiated goods and incurs disutility from supplying labour








ut = U (Ct) ￿ ￿(ht (j))dj: (2.2)
0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount rate. U and ￿ are functions that satisfy
standard properties of continuity and regarding their ￿rst and second derivatives.
There are j industries producing j industry-speci￿c goods in the economy. Each
household supplies labour to a single industry. We assume there exist perfect
capital markets that enable insurance across households against idiosyncratic
uncertainty, and that the initial level of asset holdings of each household is
































where e ￿ > 0 and !w > 0 are constants. In the social welfare function, Yt denotes
aggregate demand, while b Gt stands for a shock to government expenditures, which
is the only source of disturbance in our model.4 The shock is observed after
individual (and policy) decisions have been made in the economy. Consumption











in which " > 0 is a constant and represents the elasticity of substitution across
goods in the goods market. Minimization of an expenditure function subject to
(2.6) yields an expression for the optimal consumption of good j. A standard
income identity then implies the demand function
















Furthermore, we assume a decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology so
that
yt (j) = ht (j)
1=￿ ; (2.9)
4We use a shock to government spending to illustrate our main point because its ￿scal
consequences are most obvious from among the shocks. It is also through such a shock the
closest we can get to modelling a ￿ ￿scal stimulus￿in our framework, which is the context much





in which Y stands for steady-state aggregate output.
6with ￿ > 1. This setup allows us to express the total disutility from supplying

















We have used ! = ￿(1 + !w) ￿ 1.
The representative household maximizes (2.3) subject to a standard
intertemporal constraint
PtCt + Bt = (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)
Z 1
0
wt (j)ht (j)dj + Pt￿t;
equating after-tax wage and dividend income ￿ together with asset returns to
consumption and change in assets B. w and i are period nominal wage and
interest rates, respectively. ￿ denotes the proportional tax rate levied on wage
income. This problem yields the Euler equation that de￿nes the stochastic asset



























where lower-case subscripts denote the respective ￿rst derivatives.
72.2. Firms
Firms maximize pro￿ts with wages being the only cost item in their accounts.
The t-period pro￿t function of a ￿rm producing good j can be written as follows
￿t (k) = (1 + ￿
s)pt (j)yt (j) ￿ wt (j)yt (j)
￿ ￿ T: (2.14)
The constant ￿s stands for a time- and state-invariant subsidy received by the ￿rms
from the government as a compensation to eliminate the distortions arising from
taxation and excess market power. The inclusion of such a subsidy is conceptually
useful, as it ensures that in￿ ation is zero in the Ramsey steady state.5 Here, we
also include a steady-state lump-sum tax T on the private sector. This is a
parametric assumption that ensures that the government runs a surplus in the
steady state.
We assume pricing according to Calvo (1983), with ￿ being the probability of
leaving prices unchanged in a given period. The ￿rm is choosing the optimal price
and the intertemporal ￿rst-order condition￿ which de￿nes price dispersion (and
hence implicitly also in￿ ation) as a function of discounted streams of marginal





























5Relaxing this assumption and allowing for trend in￿ ation or a suboptimal (ine¢ cient) steady
state is a natural extension of the analysis. It is, however, associated with signi￿cant losses in
terms of the clarity of the analysis. The main results from this paper concerning long-term debt
dynamics would still hold, as we argue in section 4.3 of the paper.
8The constant ￿ = "=(" ￿ 1) stands for the price mark-up over marginal cost and











and the implicit de￿nition of in￿ ation implied by this evolution of the price level.
The variable p￿
t above is the (common) optimal price chosen by the optimizing















Monetary and ￿scal authorities, the two branches of the central government,
coordinate their actions to ensure that social welfare given by (2.3) is maximized.
The government raises revenue via distortionary taxes on wage income to ￿nance
exogenous government spending G and the steady-state subsidy. It also collects
the lump-sum tax from the private sector. It issues one-period nominal bonds to
bridge the gap between taxation and spending. The government therefore faces a
￿ ow budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1 ￿ Pt￿t (2.20)
where B denotes the volume of one-period nominal bonds issued by the ￿scal












yt (j)dj + T:



























which requires the current value of outstanding real liabilities to be o⁄set by the
discounted sum of future primary surpluses, all priced in marginal utility terms.
We have used (2.12) to substitute for the period interest rates. We also assume
that government policies are such that a no-Ponzi condition and a transversality
condition on debt are satis￿ed.
2.4. Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model is given by state-contingent paths for endogenous
variables fYT;bT;￿T;￿T;￿T;iT;wTg
1
T=t that satisfy (2.12), (2.13) with w =
R 1
0 w(j)dj, (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.22), given values for bt￿1;￿t￿1:
The standard way to proceed from here is to set up an optimal policy problem,
which involves ￿nding the government policy consistent with the equilibrium of the
economy such that maximizes social welfare (2.3). Under the timeless perspective
approach to optimal policy, the Lagrangian contains terms that constrain the
policy maker to implement the long-run optimum in the initial period. We solve
such a problem numerically, and present ￿rst- and second-order-accurate results
in section 4 of the paper.
3. The unconditionally optimal policy
One encounters di⁄erent perspectives on optimality in the optimal policy
literature. Kim et al. (2005), for instance, have argued in favour of de￿ning
10optimal policy over conditional expectations to allow policies to deliver di⁄erent
stochastic steady states. Indeed, this has been the perspective taken in the
most recent papers on optimal monetary and ￿scal policy interactions. There is,
however, an alternative perspective going back to Taylor (1979) and Whiteman
(1986), also used in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Erceg et al. (2000) to
evaluate alternative policy options, and most recently treated extensively in the
context of monetary policy design in Damjanovic et al. (2008) and Jensen and
McCallum (2010). Whilst constraining the analysis to stationary outcomes, this
perspective seeks to identify the policy that is optimal on average for all possible
initial conditions in an economy.
The treatment of initial conditions is particularly important for welfare in
environments in which expectations of future policy determine current and past
outcomes. The essence of the debate in the literature on alternative concepts of
optimality is about weighing the welfare e⁄ects of dealing with initial conditions
against the welfare e⁄ects of responding optimally to shocks, which includes
allowing for non-stationary responses.
When deriving optimal policy over conditional expectations in forward-looking
frameworks, one either has to assume full commitment to the optimal Ramsey
plan, which implies a time-varying policy rule and often rather unrealistic policy
prescriptions, or bypass the time-inconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) by imposing some restriction on the nature of policy in the initial period.
This may either take the form of a commitment to a speci￿c outcome such as a
price level, as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004a), or to an appropriate policy rule
ensuring continuation, as in Benigno and Woodford (2004). In e⁄ect, formulating
optimal policies this way implies that the derived policy rule is associated with
optimal responses to shocks but will be suboptimal for a transitory period if the
system starts from non-zero initial conditions, as explained lucidly in Woodford
11(2003).6
By contrast, if optimal policy is formulated over unconditional expectations,
the policy response will be suboptimal throughout but will be ￿ optimally
suboptimal￿ according to Jensen and McCallum (2010). This is because the
economy does not respond to shocks optimally in the long-run under the
unconditionally optimal policy. However, the policy partially exploits non-zero
initial conditions and the fact that they are given, which involves a welfare gain.
Whilst ensuring continuation through a time-invariant policy rule, it is closer to
the full commitment outcome in the initial period, and to discretion in general,
where the latter also implies that the incentive to deviate from the unconditionally
optimal policy is smaller.
Having reviewed the arguments, let us state that it is not the purpose of this
paper to contribute to the discussion on the relative merits of the alternative
perspectives on optimality, nor is the intention to conduct a comparative welfare
analysis. We wish to concentrate on the implications of these alternative concepts
for optimal debt dynamics.
Turning to a more formal de￿nition of the unconditional perspective on
optimality, let us denote the historical realizations of the shock to government
spending as GT = fGsg
T
s=0 ; which have a marginal distribution F T, for all T.7
More generally, we de￿ne GT
t = fGsg
T






which 0 6 t 6 T, denote the conditional distribution of GT
t given Gt￿1. The social
6Otherwise, the conditionally optimal policy￿ in a strict sense￿ would be di⁄erent for
di⁄erent initial conditions. This dependence on initial conditions, also identi￿ed in Soderlind
(1999), could cause a substantial degree of ambiguity in the ranking of alternative policies.
7For simplicity, we consider, as in much of the analysis in the rest of the paper, that the
disturbance G is i.i.d. Damjanovic et al. (2008) set out the same problem for autocorrelated
shocks.




























This is the conditional objective the literature traditionally looks at.
Now, let F be the time-invariant joint distribution of Gt for all t. Let us also
assume that the probability distribution of an endogenous variable x, F (x(Gt)),
is time-invariant. The objective the unconditionally optimal policies will aim to
maximize is then given as follows.
De￿nition 3.1. The unconditional expectation of the social welfare function Ut,












De￿nition 3.2. The unconditionally optimal policy is a pair of sequences
fiT;￿Tg
1
T=t consistent with the maximum value of e EUt, whilst satisfying the
constraints (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.22). Equation (2.12) then de￿nes
the optimal interest rate and (2.13) gives us the optimal real wage dynamic.
Intuitively, the unconditionally optimal policy thus maximizes social welfare
on average for all possible histories of shocks. It also implies an asymptotic
distribution of initial conditions for endogenous state variables. The relevant
welfare ranking criterion for policies in the class is then de￿ned over this
distribution of initial conditions.
Let ￿i;i = 1;2;3;4;5 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.22) respectively. It follows from
what we have de￿ned above that for any stationary endogenous variable x;
e ExT = e Ext for all T > t. The law of iterated expectations holds and hence
13e Ext = e EEtxt: Another important property of the unconditional expectations of
variables with invariant distribution is that for any endogenous variable xt, it
holds that e EEt￿iTxT+1 = e E￿it￿1xt for all T > t.8 Note also that maximizing e EUt
is, given the above properties, equivalent to minimizing
Lt = ￿e EEtut: (3.1)
This is because maximizing a discounted stream of variables that are constant
in expectation is equivalent to maximizing a period utility function.9 Moreover,
since the policy that maximizes welfare in every state of nature will also maximize
welfare in a (weighted) sum of those states, i.e. in the unconditional expectation,
it is su¢ cient to evaluate policies according to the term inside the unconditional
expectation operator in (3.1). The solution from here onwards again follows
standard steps used in optimal control problems.
4. Numerical results
To analyze the dynamic implications of alternative perspectives on optimality
in the context of our model, we conduct several numerical exercises. We solve
the policy problems de￿ned in the previous sections using the procedure of
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b). We shall look at the dynamics of the economy
implied by ￿rst- and second-order approximations to the optimality conditions,
and concentrate on optimal debt dynamics.
8These properties follow from the de￿nition of stationarity. See, for instance, Hamilton (1994,
pp. 45-6 and 261-2).
9We have dropped the scaling factor 1=(1 ￿ ￿) which, of course, has no e⁄ect on the relative
ranking of alternate policies within the class of stationary policies.
14Parameter Value
Discount factor ￿ 0:99
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion e ￿
￿1 0:13
Elasticity of substitution in the goods sector " 10:0
Production function parameter ￿ 1:25
Calvo-pricing parameter ￿ 0:65
Inverse Frisch elasticity !w 0:18
Steady-state tax on wage income ￿ 0:30
Share of private consumption on Y C=Y 0:80
Table 4.1: Parameter values
4.1. Parameterization
We parameterize the model using the values in Table 4.1. The values for e ￿
￿1 and
!w = (1 + !)=￿￿1 are consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). We set
the lump-sum steady-state transfer from the private sector to the government so
that there is a primary surplus consistent with a 40 percent public debt-to-GDP
ratio in the steady state. In the stochastic simulations, the standard deviation of
the distribution from which the government spending shock is drawn is assumed
to be one percent.
4.2. Numerical exercises
We conduct three exercises. In all, we look at the consequences of a single non-
inertial innovation to the government spending-to-GDP ratio.10 First, we look
at the optimal dynamics when the optimality conditions under both the timeless
and unconditional perspective on optimal policy are log-linearized. Second, we
simulate the second-order-accurate non-stochastic optimal economies. Third, we
10One advantage of considering a non-inertial shock is that it is easy to disentangle endogenous
inertia from the e⁄ects of serial correlation in the shock. Otherwise, the latter might dominate
for a considerable length of time. Also, note that the convergence properties are the same in
response to initial debt and hence we do not treat this question separately.
15look at optimal dynamics in second-order-accurate stochastic economies.
Result 1 In the log-linearized unconditionally optimal economy, public
debt converges to its non-stochastic steady state at a rate determined by the rate
of time preference.
In other words, half of the response in public debt to the shock is undone only
after approximately 17 years. We also see from Figure 4.1 that the dynamic of the
unconditionally optimal economy involves more short-term volatility than under
the economy under the timelessly optimal plan.11 This follows from the fact that
under the unconditionally optimal perspective, the degree to which tax smoothing
can be implemented is limited. This is intuitive and follows from the way
formulation of unconditionally optimal policies implied by the ranking criterion
(3.1) di⁄ers from the formulation of policies optimal from a timeless perspective.
When deriving optimal responses to shocks over conditional expectations, one
discounts future welfare losses arising from deviations in public debt, the tax
rate and hence output from their steady-state levels. The bene￿ts of short-
term stability outweigh the (discounted) costs of permanent future deviations.
Hence, optimal tax smoothing involves a permanent tax increase, which makes it
possible to achieve more stability in the short term through more extensive use
of debt ￿nance. In the case of the alternative class of policies we examine, the
intertemporal ￿ terms of trade￿are di⁄erent. The unconditional welfare measure is
de￿ned so that future welfare losses are undiscounted and thus receive an equal
weight. This makes the policy of a permanent shift in public debt and the tax rate
an unattractive strategy. Debt and taxes are thus brought back to their steady
11The short-term dynamics is little changed when we later consider higher-order
approximations. Hence, we do not reproduce this ￿gure for higher-order approximations, and
concentrate instead on debt dynamics. Also, note that one on the vertical axes denotes a one-
percent deviation from the non-stochastic steady state.



































Figure 4.1: Optimal dynamics under timeless perspective and unconditionally
optimal dynamics in the log-linearized economy
state level at the cost of somewhat higher short-term volatility.
Result 2 Optimal debt dynamics in second-order-accurate deterministic
models do not di⁄er substantially from those in the linearized optimal economies.
We simulated the optimal economies of sections 2 and 3 using second-order
approximations around their non-stochastic steady state, assuming that the agents
have perfect foresight. Figure 4.2 shows that the optimal reactions to a one-period
increase in government spending barely di⁄er from those obtained in the linearized
economy. The conclusions concerning the optimal speed of debt reduction in the
unconditionally optimal economy remain unchanged.
Result 3 In the second-order-accurate stochastic optimal economy, public
debt follows a unit root process with a drift under timeless perspective but converges
to a new unconditional mean in the unconditionally optimal economy. The implied
autocorrelation coe¢ cient of debt is approximately the discount factor in the


















Figure 4.2: Debt dynamics in the log-linearized and in the second-order accurate
non-stochastic economy
unconditionally optimal economy and even closer to unity in the baseline timelessly
optimal economy.
As established in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b), and also shown in Gomme
and Klein (2011), the second-order-accurate solution to the dynamic of a variable
in a stochastic economy contains a deterministic drift term accounting for the
impact of the presence of uncertainty on the mean of the optimal decision rules.
Thereby, in a stochastic setting, the unconditional means of variables may be
di⁄erent from their non-stochastic steady state values, whereas they coincide (in
stationary models) under ￿rst-order approximation. Adam (2010) reports the
drift terms associated with public debt as the parameter determining optimal
debt reduction.
Whilst we see debt reduction being consistent with the timelessly optimal
policy in our model too, the process for debt does not represent convergence to
18zero.12 The in￿ uence of drift terms comes on top of an economy that has a unit
root. This conclusion is based on the information in the previous exercise, and is
also con￿rmed when we plot the optimal response in public debt for an economy
with more volatile shocks in the bottom panel of Figure 4.3. Moreover, Table 4.2
tells us that the drift term associated with debt is positive. Yet we still see a
gradual reduction in debt being consistent with optimal policy.13
Interestingly also, debt converges back to a new unconditional mean which is
higher than the steady state in an unconditionally optimal economy, as also seen
from Figure 4.3, whilst the drift term associated with the optimal debt dynamic
has the same sign as in the timelessly optimal economy.
We ￿nd that the key factor underlying these dynamics is the curvature of the
￿rms￿marginal revenue function F with respect to uncertainty. Marginal revenue
in the timelessly optimal economy is concave with respect to uncertainty about
the level of spending, whilst it is convex in the unconditionally optimal economy.
From the perspective of price stabilization in the face of uncertainty, it is thus
optimal to move into a territory in which changes in uncertainty have less of an
e⁄ect on marginal revenue by reducing (raising) the level of output below (above)
its steady-state level in the unconditionally (timelessly) optimal economy. The
corresponding optimal tax policy features a permanently higher (lower) tax rate,
which ￿nances a permanently higher (lower) level of public debt relative to the
steady state.
12We have assumed that the transversality condition is satis￿ed, albeit demonstrating this
is not necessarily straightforward. One might also have concerns about the accuracy of
approximation under such non-stationary dynamics. As in Benigno and Woodford (2004,
footnote 26), one can impose a suitable distribution on the disturbances to ensure the economy
remains in the neighbourhood of the steady state. An interesting line of thought is whether the
policy maker would wish to ￿ne-tune his steady-state subsidization policy in the light of the
level e⁄ects of uncertainty. We abstract from such considerations in the analysis given that the
steady-state subsidy is motivated by analytical rather than fundamental reasons.
13Note that the source of disturbance in our model are government spending shocks, whilst
Adam (2010) looks at the consequences of productivity shocks.













timeless perspective - high variance
t
Figure 4.3: Second-order-accurate optimal debt dynamics in the stochastic
economy
The rate of debt adjustment is in either case very slow. The serial correlation
coe¢ cient of the debt series under timeless perspective exceeds 0.9999, whilst it is
again approximately the discount factor in the unconditionally optimal economy.14
4.3. General remarks
The results concerning optimal debt dynamics under ￿rst-order approximation
require little quali￿cation if one were to consider more complicated models in
the family of models to which our simple setup belongs. The general intuition
concerning debt dynamics outlined below would be little changed, should we
consider models with sticky wages in addition to prices, di⁄erent indexation
mechanisms to introduce more real or nominal inertia or in which no steady-
14The coe¢ cient under timeless perspective falls when the standard deviation of the shock is
increased. For example, it falls to 0.998 on average over the ￿rst twenty years of adjustment if
the standard deviation of the distribution from which the shock is drawn is increased ￿ve times
(as shown in the bottom panel in Figure 4.3).








Table 4.2: Constant terms associated with the impact of uncertainty (x 1=104)
state subsidy would exist or be of practical use, and hence the optimal steady
state would be associated with non-zero in￿ ation.15
A straightforward way of detecting what happens to debt in the linearized
model is to inspect the dynamic properties of the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the ￿scal solvency constraint (2.22). Such a constraint is present in all
models with endogenous ￿scal dynamics. The standard result from the literature
using welfare measures de￿ned over conditional expectations is that this shadow
price is a Martingale. When the objective is unconditional, the shadow price
follows an autoregressive process. The value of the shadow price is non-zero if the
solvency condition binds when shocks hit the economy, which is the case under
nominal rigidity and distortive taxation: This means that welfare is enhanced if
debt ￿nance di⁄erent from the steady-state level of debt is available following
shocks. The optimal solution will then entail a deviation in debt from its steady
state value. The unit-root property of the Lagrange multiplier under timeless
perspective implies maintaining a higher debt level will be optimal, whilst the
15See Horvath (2007) for analysis including sticky wages in an environment with an ine¢ cient
zero-in￿ ation steady state. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2006) and Chugh (2006) only report
serial correlations for public debt, showing that debt follows a near-random-walk process under
nominal rigidity. Although Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2006) do not comment explicitly on the
issue of stationarity, the ￿gures seem to suggest a level shift under optimal policy.
21autoregressive nature under unconditional optimality tells us that the positive
contribution of debt increments to welfare will slowly vanish over time, and hence
debt will slowly converge back to its mean value. Short-term dynamics of public
debt might be temporarily dominated by the certain inertial elements elsewhere
in the model such as habits, price and wage indexation schemes as well as inertial
shocks. Once these in￿ uences die out, one would observe debt staying permanently
higher under timeless perspective, and a smooth convergence determined by the
rate of time preference back to the mean under unconditional optimality.
In terms of policy, such debt dynamic is a consequence of the policy maker
placing a smaller weight in the policy rule (by a factor of ￿) on lagged variables
under the unconditionally optimal policy relative to the policy optimal from a
timeless perspective. Since our model di⁄ers from Benigno and Woodford (2004)
only to the extent that the steady state is assumed to be e¢ cient, this result
is easily shown if one takes the linear-quadratic problem from their paper and
solves it using the alternative policy objectives.16 Hence, the two policies di⁄er
in the extent policy makers take into account the e⁄ect of their current decisions
on expectation formation in the past. This is a general point also mentioned in
Jensen and McCallum (2010).
Clearly, the conclusions concerning the speed of debt adjustment in the ￿rst-
order accurate model would not be a⁄ected by the type of shock considered
either, as these enter the approximated model in an additive fashion and hence,
do not in￿ uence dynamics. Adam (2010) shows that whilst the optimal steady
state of the economy and the dynamics of other variables in the system are
a⁄ected, the optimal unit-root result for debt survives when government spending
is endogenized. We have explained above why this happens and how it would
16It can be shown that the correct linear-quadratic problem de￿ned over unconditional
expectations has the same functional form as the ￿ naive￿approach of taking the unconditional
expectation of the linear-quadratic problem de￿ned over conditional expectations.
22change, should one adopt the unconditional perspective on optimal policy.
Finally, the results from the second-order-accurate stochastic simulation, in
particular the magnitude and the sign of the drift terms, appear to be model-
sensitive and also dependent on the type of shock considered. The intuition behind
our results driven by government spending shocks in a simple setup di⁄ers from
the intuition given by Adam (2010) in a more complex framework perturbed by
productivity shocks. We have repeated the simulations with productivity shocks
instead of government spending shocks in our framework, and found the drift term
associated with public debt to be negative and debt also falling at a slow speed,
as in Adam (2010). But the analysis in this paper also tells us that looking at
the drift term associated with debt might not be su¢ cient to fully account for
its dynamics. Also, the new mean to which the unconditionally optimal economy
converges to following the productivity shock was below the non-stochastic steady
state, which is di⁄erent from the convergence seen following government spending
shocks. It would perhaps be interesting to investigate this issue further in the
context of a medium-scale macroeconomic model.
5. Conclusions
We have looked at the question of optimal debt adjustment in a New Keynesian
economy from the angle of two di⁄erent concepts of optimality. We have shown
that the conventional result of keeping debt and taxes permanently at a di⁄erent
level following shocks no longer holds if one considers the unconditionally optimal
policy, or if second-order considerations are brought into play in a stochastic
setting. We found that the speed of debt reduction consistent with optimal
policy is likely to be very slow, with the half life of debt adjustment exceeding 17
years. Given this slow speed of adjustment, it might be interesting to consider
appropriate institutional arrangements to implement such optimal plans as a
23distinct and credible strategy within a class of policies that includes more costly
alternatives with a similar dynamic for public debt.
Throughout the paper, we assumed that ￿scal solvency is always satis￿ed, and
that the interest rate on public debt does not carry a risk premium. Allowing
for the possibility of default and increases in the risk premium following increases
in public debt might a⁄ect the optimal debt adjustment following shocks. An
interesting avenue for future research is thus to consider optimal debt adjustment
in the context of the recently developed literature on ￿scal limits and sovereign
default.
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